The heightened pace of corporate governance reforms has focussed attention on country-specific governance models. Considerable debate has ensured as to whether the outsider Anglo-Saxon system or the insider Continental system is most applicable to India. This paper repOlts the resu lts of a study of Indian governance which used a primary qualitative approach of twelve interviews of key executives of five large firms in 2008 as well as publicly available documents. A literature review establishes six key characteristics that distinguish the two major systems. The governance characteristics of the Indian firms are classified in terms of the two systems with a view to assessing the extent and nature of hybridization. TIle findings endorse the hybrid corporate governance system of India, clearly identifying similarities and differences to the two major governance models. In drawing on rich interview data, the paper delves into the national characteristics of India that have influenced the hybrid model such as stewardship, corporate social responsibility and partnerships between the corporate and commu nity sectors. The evolution of the governance practices and the rationale for their existence are also examined. The paper demonstrates that the hybrid governance system has emanated from countly-specific culture including va lues and ideologies, and political orientation of socialism. The scope of this study was limited to large listed companies and business groups. Future research should use a larger and more diverse sample including private and unaffiliated firms fo r outcomes that can be generali zed. "Sellior Lecturer ill (Final/ce, ([)eali.ill QJus£lIess Selioor, f[)eali,j11 VlIiversity, 221 f[JurevoodJfig(lWay, (/Jurevooa. 'VfC'ltJ<RJ)I 3125 )tu.sLrafia Plioll': +61 3 9244 6543 'Fax; +61392445533 f£ maiC: vijaya.tliyi{@tfeali,,{lI.etfu.au **;f.ssodate ®'ofessor, (])irector of Corporate fJ?/spollsi6ility mu{ 9[06(1.( Citizel/sliip, qraduate Senoor oJ'Ma1/aoefl/et/t La 'Tro6e VI/iversit), 1(jllgs6uryQ)rive, (/3l11u{oora, vu::rOJUJf 3086 lP/iolle: +61 394793140
Introduction
The heightened pace of corporate governance reforms in developing coun tries has focussed atten tion on country-specific governance models, with practitioners and scho lars attempti ng to understand the similarities and differences of the models. One clear indication from th e country studies is that a mixed system of govern ance can emerge in developing cou ntries (Afshari pour, 2009). For instance, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000: 168) observed that 'based on some broad compar isons with th e two main Corporate OWI1Cfsfiip e:L COlltro( /'Vo{lI me 8, lsme 1, Q'a[[2010, COI/l; //uea -4 explain a behavioural phenomenon or practice. Alpaslall (2009) voiced this concern when he observed, 'when (t corporation accepts responsibility and accommodates stakeholders wishes it may not alwnys be easy to figure out the real inrcntions of the corporat ion'. This study seeks to bridge this gap in governance research. By using rich intervi ew data with key executives in large, established Indian businesses, it delves into the origins and rational e or the governance-system, the intentions in instituting the governance practices, and the cultural beliefs and assumptions 011 which the practices arc based. In doing so, it highlights the nature of Indian corporflte governance as a hybrid system and in particular explains the specific form this hybridization takes. Thus, the key contribution of this research is its tilli queness in its approach 10 hi ghlighting the characteristics of the Indian system and its cOl11lllonnlitics and differences to the two typically referred to systcms-namcly Anglo-Saxon systems and Con tinental system s.
Furthermore, an cmpirical study of governancc issues in India, in particular, is thought to be imporlnnt due to India having a number of unique govcrnance issues (Jackling & Johl, 20(9) . Not only in term s of governance practice, but also with regard to theory development, India and other developing countries offer tremendous opportunities (Judge, 2009) , making this study timcly and I'el evnllt. Particular governance charactcristics are evident in relation to ownership, board structures, role of stock exc hange, role of banks and amount of n'ec float. For instance Allen ct al. (2007: 22) , based on their sample of 2753 Indian nOll-financial finns, reported that controlling intcrests in about 78% of (he Indian firms reside with a particular individual or G1mily. However, pyrmniding, cross-holdings and non-public trusts mean that their governance structures are comp!ex and opaque (Jackling & Johl , 2(09). Hence, an analysis of' India's homc·~growJl, stylizcd governancc system will provide information for coun tries such as China and Germany and the South Asian region that have a large proportion of h11llilyowned businesses. For these countries, th e development ofa 'home-grown' governance system is a necessity. not a choice, ifgood governance is to take root (Jaffer & Sohail, 2007) , Not only do [ndian firm, need to have an increased undcrstanding of their own practices, with globali7.ation, foreign multinationals doing business in India need to be aware orlhe Indian govcrnance system (Li & Nair, 2009 ). This paper provides empirical evidence of the corporate govcrnance systems in large businesses in India by exploring two types of data: one, the publicly (lwdlable da ta from the Indian stock exchanges and the company's annual reports, and two, the intcrview da ta from twelve key informants from fivc cstablished Indian businesses. It firstly reviews the literature in relation to the Anglo~Saxon and Continenta l governance models before discussing the characteristics of the Indian governance model. 11 thcn presents the methodology and subsequentl y the interview data ordered by case st udy orga ni S<1tions. The characteristics are classified in terms of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems with a view to assessing the extent and nature of hybriciiZc1tioll. The limitations of the study and future research needs arc also prescnted.
Review of Literature
The majo)' cO)'poral"e goveJ"nance systems Several scholars have articulated the key HSpccts of the main global corporate governance systems. One approach has been to scrutin ize th e systems (l{ the level of counh'ies; and the other approach has been to examinc the systems at the level of firms. Weimer and Pape's (1999) taxonomy was based OJ) corporate governance systems at the level of countries. The authors delineated two market-ori crlled systems -the Anglo-Saxon and German ie, and two network-oriented systems -Latin and Japanese, based on a set of discernible and easily obtained data. The variables used were:
• the prevailing concept of the finn in terms of whether it WaS oriented to independent shareholders who exercised control through the external stock market, or whether several groups of oligarchic stakeholders influenced decision-making;
• whether the board had a single ticr with both executive and supervisory responsibilities 01' whether there was a dual structure;
• whether the shares wcre widel y held or concentrated in the hands of a few;
• whethcr the stock Jll(trket importance was high or low based on two indicators used by the World Federation of Exchanges;
• whethcr the external market was active;
• the cxtent to which executive compensation was dependent on corporate performance; and
• the time hori zon of economic relationships. Accordingly, Anglo-Saxon systems were shareholder-oriented, exhibited singl e-ticr boards, accorded high importance to Ihe economy's stock market and hence had an active external mark et and focused on short-term relationships. In contrast, a Con tinental system with its cross-shareholdings and inter-locking directorships exhibited long-term relationships, a stakeholder orientation, relatively less-widely held shares and accorded a low importance to the stock market.
In 200 I, Nestor and Thompson distingui shed the 'outsider' system , or market-based system, from the Continental system or ' insider' system. Accordingly. the 'outsider' systcm is characterised by a lega l and regulatory approach based on the assumption that the dispersed body of' investors who own the compuny need to be protected. Thus, this system 'presumcs ample disclosure of information, strict trading rules and liquid stock markets' (p. 23). In contrast, in the 'insider' system, ownership and control is relatively 11lore closely held. Thus, the dispersal of ownership is low with fewer agency problems in comparison to th e 'outsider' systcm.
Garre!t (2004: 2) distinguished the governance systems as falling along H "rules-based" versus "prin ciple-based" continuum as follows:
A simple explanation of the difference between the two approaches is illustrated by the different concepts conveyed by the terms "law" and "guideline". The result is a different mindsel with respect to corporate governance in the United States, which applies a rule-or law-based approach, where what is not prohibited is permitted, compared to a principles-based approach where greater discretion is vested in a company's management to make decisions regard ing governance activities. A principles-based approach to governance is one ill which guidelines are clear, but compliance with them is voluntary. Thus, the rules-based system is more common in countries that adopt the Anglo-Saxon system, while companies relying on principles arc more ollen regarded as operating within the Continental system. Although there are national di (ferences with countries such as UK, Ca nada and Australia classified as principles-based within an Anglo model.
Of' those who investigated the firm-level governa l)ce systems, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) fOllnd that finns in the USA and the UK rely substantially on an extensive system of rules 10 protect investors, including minority rights, which allows for an easy transfer of' shares, with power provided to shareholders for class-Hction suits or to sue directors for violations of fiduciary duty. Eighty percent of large US publicly traded firms' shares arc widely held, that is, defined as ha vin g ' no single shareholder in control of 20% of the votin g righ ts', with the remaining 20% controlled by families, and none controlled by another widely held corporation (Ryan, 2(05) . Moreover, the influence of trade unions is much less when compared with the COlltinen tal model. In contrast, firms in Europe and Japan have less reliance on elaborate legal protectioJ}s and more reliance on large investors and banks (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Cernat (2004) introduced the terms 'capitaJrelated' aspects and 'Iabour-rctated' m;pccts to differentiate the systems, and argued that the Con tinental model led to a more secure economic environment. allowing flnns to seek higher profits in the long-term as banks are represen ted 011 the Board of Directors, as opposed to the shorH erm view imposed by the stock markels 0 11 Anglo-Saxon companies. Furthermore, he reported that' n'ce 110at is limited and dividends less prioritized than in the Anglo-Saxon system' which meant that the shareholders did not face the classic Hirshmanian choice of 'voice or cxit '. Accordingly. less fluid stock markets make exit more costly. and, therefore, shareholders have a strong incentive to gain a powerful 'voice' in the management of the firm (Cern at, 2004: 154). Morek and Steier (2005) called this domination by the banks, 'bank capitalism', and observed that errant managers could be forced back into order by the banks that could withhold credit and starve the misgoverned firm of capital. However, the authors cautioned that bank capitalism or the Continental system, would allocate capital efficiently only if the bankers were altruistic and competent, and would create significant problems for the firms if lhe hanks arc themselves misgovellled.
From the brief review of the major governance systems provided above, it is apparent that two models dominate, namely, the AngloRSnxon model and the Continental model albeit with some national idiosyncrasies. The distinguishing features of both models are summarized in Figure I . The Anglo-Saxon governance system seeks to protect shareholders through a multitude of laws and regulations. The decision criterion for whether Indian governance fits the anglo model is the evidence of mandatory legal rules, regulations and codes for the governance of companies. The governance system also needs to demonstrate enforcement of the regulations. Givcn India's tradition of English common law and a dcmocratic political system (Li & Nair, 2009 ), one would expect Indian corporate governance to adhere more closely to the Anglo-Saxon system. Ghosh (2006) 209) who observed , in their study of capita l markets, regulation and corporate ownership, that an increased focus on rules and regulations would result in the stock market being accorded a prominent role in the economy. Their argument was premised on the principle of 'equa l access to information and protection of small investors fi'om exploitation by domin ant shareh olders'. Thus, an Anglo-Saxon governance system with its dom inance of regulations wou ld demonstrate a prominent stock market and enhanced market control.
The decision va riable for gauging the importan ce of the stock market is thc Market 
Presence lind Degree of Influence oj (l large shareholder:
In a Continental system, one specific shareholder or a large shareh oldcr can oftcn be identified who exerts a substantial influence on managerial decisionmaking. It is usuall y either a domestic or forci gll promoter. The deci sion criterion as 10 wheth er the g~vel.·mHl cc S.ylclll would be ca tegorised as Anglo or Contmcnlal IS the presencc of this OI1C significant ~llareh older, with 'signi ficant ' defined as 'ownersllip nltcrcsts greater than 20%'. This cut-off point is well acknowledged by other researchers (La Porta et al. , 1999: 57; Ryan , 2005 ). In con trast, the absen ce of one sped {ic large sha reholder wou ld indicate that the governance system is Anglo-Saxon. Thus, while the Con tinental system accords a high level of power to the controlling shareholder, the Anglo~Saxon system accords power for the managers as the stock ownership is dispersed. India, with its tradit ion of fi.un ily-bascd I!rms with high promoter holdin gs means that olle would expect the Indian corporate govern ance to adhere more closely to the Contin ental system.
Extent ()/ Free Flom:
0n~lo~Saxon markets arc characterized as being very hqUld, whereas the Contin ental system results in less liqu idi ty. As Berghe (2002) observed , the first reason for the low liquidity of the insider systems is th e concentrated owncrship and the resu ltant low free (loat, whil e the second reason relates to the l onger~ term perspecti ve of the average shareholders. 111 eom parison~ liquidit y in the US markets is high er, due to the relatively short-term. investment horizon and lh e signi Jlc<-lnt role of the day traders. The de~ision criterion i'or <high' liTe Ooat is a 'free 110at fac tor greater than 55%'. This usage ora cut-off point in the range of 50% -60% is in line with other scholars (Chong & Lopez-dc-Silanes, 2007: 233; Kaserer & Wagner, 2004: 14) . The free noat factor for the In dian listed companies is reported by the Bomba y Stock Exchange (BSE, 2009) MUl11bai . BSE defi nes rrec float as ' th e p roportion of tola l shares isslied by th e com pany whIch arc readily available for trading ill the Illarket. It generally excludes prorllotcrs' holdings. governmen t holdings, stra teg ic holdings and other locked~ill shares, which will not C0111e into the market ror trading in the llormal course' (BSE, 2009). It is a Slandardized calculation and updated data is ava ilable in the Business Standard publication. As Biswa l (n. d.a.) nOles, 'the availabl e free~noat in most Am.crican companies is above 90 percent wh~rca~, ill India, ~rOl. noler~ hav~ m?~e thap a 59 percept stake tn thc maJo. nt y of th e. I~rgc: cOl1wani.es" ·, w11ich mean$ that one woutd ,ex-pcet ·thcr-ln'd~lil fii·nls ,to axhibit \e1.' S n:ee float than in"the USA:. ;' . .' 1 · • ., In th e Continental system, the level of ownershi p is higher in compa rison to the An glo~Saxon system. Ghosh's (2007) study on the extent of ban k debt in Indian finns revea led that large firms had neg\igible bank debt and, hence. fewer or no nominees on Ihe Board. ThLlS, for the purposes of this study which uses large firms, one wou ld expect the rol e of banks to be low.
Strue/lire oj (he Bourd oj Directors:
.
Angl o-Saxon systems generally have a singlctlcr board, composed of Executive (inside) and 110n -Executive (outside) members, with both ca tegories of members appoin ted and di smissed by shareholders. The median number of directors is 12 (sec Hanson & Song. 2000: 62) , in comparison to the Continen tal system where there arc fewer directors. Continental systems ha~e a two-tier board classed as managerial and supervisory. Anglo boards arc also comprised of more independent directors compared to cont inental systems of governan ce. The decision cri terion is 'the number of members on the Board', 'num ber of ti ers v~sible in the Board', and the 'number of independent directors', as presented in the Annua l Reporls. In l~)dia, .the traditional boa rd structure has been single. This research uses intcrpretivism which 'stresses Ihe subjcclivc aspects of human activity by focusi ng on the meaning rather (han mC<tsurcmcnt of social phenomena' (Hussey & Hussey, 1997:53) . II claims that social phenomena arc not open to direct obscrvalion as per the positivists, but are only accessibl e via the interpretations of individuals find groups, with those involved thus assigning meaning, sign ifi cance or value (Porter, 1998: 14-5) . The interpretive paradigm is morc appropriate in situations where the researcher is aUcmpting to study real-life experiences by participation in order to better understand and express its values, details and features (Healy & Perry, 2000: 119) . It is the prererred paradigm when dealing with complex social phenomena involving reflective people who make choices in the real world, with the choices Ihemsclves being contingen t upon the environment (Healy & Perry, 2000: 120) . Thus, interpretation examines th e way people think and act, and assumes that bias is removed by accurately describing the meanings and interpretations ofparticipallts.
Publicly available data n·om the World Bank (World Bank ROSC 2004), Government or India business portal, the BSE website, th e Business Standard publication and the businesses' Annual Reports were llsed alongside the interview data to provide the context for the inter view data and to interpret the interview data.
For instance, whilst the interviews provided information on the regulations thaI the firm was complying with, the Government of India's busincss porlal was lIsed to double-check th e name and content of the regubllions, the date it was introduced and the scope oflheir application. Similarly, the Jinns' annual reports were used to collect data regarding slock ownership, dispersal of equ it y ownership, includ in g ownersh ip by banks, membership on th e Board of Directors, and the structure or the Board. Furthermore, the economy specific data was collected from the World Bank and the World Federation of Siock Exchanges.
The comprehensive case data of each finn was Llsed to classify the 1irm's governance practice as Anglo-Saxon, Continental, or a mix of both governance systems (Hybrid).
The sample respondents from five firms, their designations, and the codes used to identify lhem in the paper, are presented in Table 2 . From the governance perspective, the i()CUS was on stakeholders rather than shareholders. As MM reminisces, 'In 1994, that was the time \V€ suddenly realised Ihat there is someone ca!led a shareholder and we need to take care qf his interests as well. Until then, predominal1f~V 'rl'e had been looking at the society, taking care of the people or the public '. EA's comment defines 'stakeholders' quite broadly and aids in highlighting how CSR came to be embedded in the Indian governance system. 'The stakeholders are not just your employees or (he vendors but also the public who are residing around the factol)) or premises "
In applying principles CMD spoke of the importance of non-discrimination and transparency although adding the problematic nature of corruption in Indian society. CMD explains, 'what actual~)) it (corporate governance) rneans to us is that a) transparency, b) that \ve do not dislinguish in terms (d" caste, religion, language when H'e do business, ./01' our employees or for 0/11' customers, () unless it happens accidentally, we normally don't cheat people '. Furthermore, 'the pCI./ormance appraisal is vel)' lransparent. The employee can see what is wrilfen '. However, he hastens to add that it does not mean that his finn is lice of corruption. 'There is ahi'Clys some pelty corruplion. We cannot escape.fi"om the socie~v in which we live, because 'what is an organisation? It is a microcosm q/the socie~v that H'e live in. So whatever ills in socie~v are there, some ./orm or the other will happen here. We cannot eliminate that. But, we can mitigate il l~v pulfing in various interventions ' . I-Ie cautions that smaller private firms exist who arc focused only on profits and 'are out there to cheat the government '.
Do the firms benefit from the principles based approach? As eMD observes, 'transparency brings us a lot of happiness and at the end of the day it is also ({ good business decision. People are co}}?/hrrab/e doing business with liS. My company is known./or its vollies and transparency. That's the reason that we get some q/the best companies in the world as partners. 7Jwt makes us feel all the more that belfer governance is' good business ' . , " !:.!..JJIJJ.!ilNTA"RPRF.SS Corporate OWl1ership <t{, Conlro{ / r(/o{1.l1lle 8, Issue 1, q;'alf2010, ConLiflued -4 Case 2: Steelco 1. Stecko I is onc of the oldest integrated steel companies in India and manufactures and markets steel, steel building and construction applications. It was established in the early 1900s in India, and today its operations span the globe. Its corporate governance system was firmly established by its founders and was formalized in the 1990s when the corporate governance agenda was discussed in the public forum. Steeleo J is part of a large, diversified, fhmily-based group consisting of J 3 listed companies. Based in North India, the global conglomerate derives 61 % of its revenues 11'OIn international operations and is reported to have US$62.79 billion in total revenues. Its (otal market cap was USS41.7 billion in June 2009. Three key executives were interviewed in this company;
Vice-President, Corporate Affairs, Assistant Company Secretary and Financial Controllcr ofa Division.
Steelco 1 's annual report addresses only shareholders and the Chairman's statement begins 'Dear Shareholders'. In the 2009 financial year, the Board of Directors was two-tiered with the Executive Committee and a Joint Executive Committee, alongside a third committee speci fically for a main division of the company. It was comprised of J 4 directors, of which 8 were independent. It had a non-Executive Chairman, and the non-executivc directors made up more than 50% of the total number of directors. The shareholding pattcrn reveals that promoters, including family and group companies, hold 33.95%), foreign institutional investors (FIls) hold J 3.20%, banks hold 19.82%, and the general public owns 24% of the total shares of 730,592,471 (company website). Thus, banks are among the three major institutional investors along with the FIls and the Mutual Funds/Unit Trust of India. Steelco l's free noat was 66.05% (Business Standard, 2009).
As with Oilco, the linking of governance and CSR were fundamental to Steelcol's philosophy and vision, and was put in place by the founder. As observed by ACS, 'COllJOrate governance in Steelco} has been a vel)! importan! aspect ql running the a/jelirs ql the company. Basicalz)" in the Stee/col groups, it will seem the cOllJorate governance is also the philosophy of the company ... Our vishm says that we will take all steps for value creation, and safeO! and environment, people, and to protect the interest ql all the stakeholders ... It was the vision and the beli(f ql the founders. They always fel! that what comes jl-om the people should go back to them, many more times than what we get from them. It was a sort of we(jewe measure wherein they wanted the people to be not on~;1 working in the/fxtolY bllf also el?ioying their personal lile and then a decent community. So, a lot q( commwli(j' we(fare activities were done ' .
Hel' colleague, vr, affirms the principles based approach and adds that even the code of conduct was similarly a part of the philosophy and practice and was simply formalizcd decades later. 'It (the code of conduct) was firs! handwritten and we allfollowed il.
There were no documents. In 1996 we formal()1 documented if ' .
The data reveals that the 100 year old company had institutionalized best practice governance fh)111 the 1940s bascd on valucs and principles, rather than regulation. In fact, the practices fbllowed by this company became mandated by legislation sevcral years later, when the Government of India realized the bcnefits of such governance standards.
ACS describes how their practices led the way for legislation. 'The many facilities which we are (dlering to the shareholdel:\', we \vere doing this without thinking about regulations ... Even right fi'om {he earZF 90's (lY011 see, we had so IIW}~l' practices which were not sort (?f'laid down on a legislative level . ... like the 8 hour working, the l11aterni~v leave provision, the provident .limd and the bonus, which subsequently the government realized are vel)' important employee we(fclre activities. And, that '.'I' how the legislations were founded. It (our prac/ice.\~ was the origin qf' several legislations like the Factories Act, the Provident Fund Act, the Payment C?f' Bonus Ac!, the MaternUy Leave Provision. Steelcol I'vas already having some of the committees like the audit committee which have been subsequently made mandatOl), by the Clause 49. We had set U up in 1986 whereas the legislation came in 2()O}. Again, take the whistle blower policy. At Steelco} we have had (he policy and it has been made mandatGl)!. We also have an e!hics counsellor and an etMcs commirtee '. She points out that the Clause 49 regulation and compliancc in its current form states the whistle blower policy as 'optional'.
Due to its exemplary standards, Stecleo 1 has been a role model for several businesses in India. This has been corroborated by Oilco in their interview data above, where they mentioned some of the firms for their excellent governance standards.
However, the introduction of legislation docs not mean that the standards will became pervasive. Its implementation is critical and as observed by ACS, the Indian govcrnance system is lagging on this fhmt. 'If' you legislate but you dOI1 ' { monitor, then thal legislation becomes a piece q(paper. So it lacks teeth. SEEI is the watchdog. But it lacks teeth. It cannot pursue, il cannot prosecute or take any aclion against the (~fJending companies '. Thus, she adds that despite the strict Clause 49 compliance, some firms 'might fu(fll it in terms C?( the substance hut not in the true .spirit '. directors of which 11 were non-Executive, Steeleo 2 had 8 independent directors and mentions that this proportion is more than the stipulated 50% requirement. Apart fl:om the Chairman, the Yice-Chairman and the MD, no other directors were hlmily mcmbers (Annual Rcport 2009: 39), Its shareholding pattern reveals that promoters, including family and group companies, hold 45.02%, ioreign institutional investors (Fils) hold 29.03%, banks hold 1.51 %, employees own 0,04%, and the public owns 9.07% of the total shares of 187,048,682 (I'. 51).
Thus, ownership by banks is low, SteeJco 2's free float was 41.25% (Business Standard, 2009).
In regard to governance and the impact of regulation JMD states: 'The message we get/rom our management is that Hie should always /hllow all the rule,..,', regulations, lal1ls' and we should always be on the right side (d' the law. So, we have no pressure to do anything wrong, ever', Both .IMD and his colleague GMHR are of the view that good governance includes the aspect of embracing the community surrounding their finn. 'One philosophy that our company has is that unless the people around you are happy, you cannot grow. We need to have them in with you' [GMHR] . JMD adds, 'this fhctOJJI and its surroundings ... we are married to each other. 7'lwse are the people in whose land this /actOl:J! has come up. We have to deal with them evelY dr{V and they have to deall1'ith liS. Some (!l them have got bene/it out (~f'it; some q/them have not gO! bene.fit out it, Those who have got hene.fit I~v direct emph~}'ment, or indirect employmem, or contructs, or suppliers, are line. /Jut, there are many others who have 110t gO! hene.fit. Ollr responsihility is towards them also ' . JMD highlights the crucial interdependency of the finn and its community, According to him, when the firm supports the surrounding community irrespective of whether they arc its employees or nOl, the goodwil! in turn provides a protective moat for the firm, 'And that re,sponsihili(y (supporting the commlmi(v) is a requirement. It is not something to talk ahout, That is the ba.,,.ic need to run this organisation. 1/ you have good relations with them, nothing will go wrong. , He cites instances of how their firm avoided strikes and lock-outs due to this strong positive relationship, A VP also sums up the broad approach ofStee1co2 to this principle, 'Our management has this outlook, that ((' we introduce something to the industlY, we introduce something/or the socieO ' and something to the nation too, We (the firm) have to take care qf the local people, the community. q/ course, there is the government. But, government cannol give to evel:vbo{~V' This is the way we are looking at it ' . JMD further links governance to sustainability: '(/ we have good c0/1}omte governance the company will not go into liquidation overnight '. and non-Executive members. Of the total of 8 members, 2 were executive directors and the remaining 6 were non-executive members, Three were independent professional directors. The shareholding paltern reveals that a foreign body corporate classified under promoter group holds 80% of the total shares, with 0% of Indian promoters, FIls own 6.14%, banks have 0% ownership, and the total institutional shareholding is 6,36%. The noninstitutional shareholders comprise bodies corporate, individual shareholders (4.5%), OCBs, and nonresident Indians (NRIs), with total shares of 22,500,000 (company website, p. 54). Thus, banks have no ownership or role, Aluminiumco's free float was 20% (Business Standard, 2009 ). The principles-based approach of the Indian governance system elucidated by OileD and Steeleo respondents is also confirmed by this finn. CSL observes, 'The Tata Group, who started 100 years ago, . have built excellent institutes like Tata Institute (~/ Social Sciences ... Even the Birla Group was vel)' pioneering and they have set up institutions. many schools ... many institutes, temples, planetariums, and this was all voluntmy. 111ere was no law which says that you have to ,spend on cOlporate social responsibility. Social responsibiliz), qf a business entity Ivas always in the minds q/ the old bwdness hOllses, The notion that we have earned so much and we should go and give if back to the socieo' was already there bit! now I think we have a more structured ,)),stem', He adds, 'voluntarily we have accepted the United Nations Global Compact Principles. We believe that governance is something lhal should corne volunta)'i~)I. It is going beyond the rules. This is our philosophy', His colleague, ACSR observes, 'whether you call it ('"'SR, or whether you call it philanthropy, it doesn't mat/er. What matters is , " that when you have the capacity to take somebody with yo/.(, 1 think you should do it '.
The value system based on stewardship emanated yet again from the Indian culture and ideologies articulated by Gandhi. 'We believe that trust ... the concept q( trusteesl7lI) given by Gandhiji means that the management qlthe company is trustee of (he shareholders' [CSL] .
CSL stresses the stakeholder perspective of the firm. 'For liS, the employees are one ql the most important stakeholders; the government too is another important stakeholder'. ACSR explains this perspective further. 'I look at it this wqy, the emph~)iee .fin(1/~J! goes into the community. So doing it (we((are activiOe.s) for the employee or the cOI11//1uniO', one s/7ouldn '!make too strong a demarcation between the two'.
Another line of rcsponding about 'good governance' was the link shown here by CSL: 'cOljJorate governance is more ql an ethical issue where ultimate~y a good governed company will certain(v be rewarded by the stakeholders .J say that cO/parate governance can also bring p/"(~/its. And also hring value. It takes years to build a good name but it takes seconds to ,spoil if. So at the same time it's not easy. You have to be really on your toes as people are watching. EvCl:v employee should imbibe this culture ' .
Case

5:
TextilemachinelYco.
Textilemachineryco was founded in 1962 and designs, develops and exports a range of textile machinery. This company is the smallest in the sample used for this study. Based in South India, it reported revenues of Rs13380lJ9 lakhs (approximately US$280 million) for the financial year ending in 2009, One key executive was interviewed in this company. The Company Secretary was interviewed for this case.
Textilemachineryco's director's report (p. 42) addresses only shareholders as 'Dear Shareholders'. In the 2008 financial year, the Board of Directors was single-tiered with Executive and non-Executive members. Of the total of8 members, 2 were executive directors and the remaining 6 were non-executive mcmbcrs, and included an institutional nominee representing the insurance segment. Three were independent professional directors. Thc shareholding pattern for the 2009 financial year reveals that an Indian body corporate classified under Indian promoters holds 23,37% of the total shares, with 0% foreign promoters, FIls own 0.31 %. banks have 0.02% ownership and insurance companies hold 18.18%, with the total institutional shareholding at 22.20%. The non-institutional shareholders comprise 52% of total shareholders and include bodies corporate (15.11%), individual shareholders (19,74%) , and OCBs (13.19%), with total shares of 12,369,250 (company website).
The company's shares were listed on the Madras Stock Exchange also. Textilcmachincryco's hee float was 74.19% (Business Standard, 2009 ).
Similar to other interviewed busincsses, Textilemachineryco's CS cxplains that thc founder had instituted the culture or good governance well beforc the formal rules and regulations. "Actual()I the corporate governance concept and corporate commillees were appointed five or six years back . But, even before that we were practising all this, although it was not published in our annual reports. The (company) founder was responsible .fiJI' this ethical way (~( conducting the business. This culture thaI is in practice now in our company has been imbibed at the velY beginning itsefl".
Similarly, CS describes the principles-based governance practices followed by the linn voluntarily and proactively without the necessity of legislation.
'COI]Jorate governance as Ive understand is total sati,y(action q( all the stakeholders -the shareholders. the promoters, the suppliel:\', the customers, the workCl:s', that is, our employees, all these people who are connected with and working with the organization. Yes, all these things were in our business routines, even bqlore it was made compulsOlY, or mandated as law. Voluntari~}' we have been in compliance with these reqUirements ' .
Due to its best practice governance standards, Textilemachineryco has become a role model Jor several finns, similar to Stee!coL 'Many companies fhllow our model'. CS explains onc aspect of the model is the principle of not taking advantage of the firm's superior market position to exploit others. 'Ours is a monopo~y. Even though we are a monopoly, we don't treat our customers that way. When there is a lot (~l demand suddenly, we don'r raise the prices. Another thing is, ;;1 whatever we do, 11/e do }lot discrbninate hetween customers -the small players or the big customers. Whatever the size q/the order, we quote the same price. Further, we have a queue (\ystem) fbI' delivelY. we never by-pass the queue. Whatever be the case, nofavouritism is shown. Although we have our own group companies Ive don't give preference to any qlour group companies. T1wv should also stand in the queue. Even the foreign competitors are unable 10 compete with liS hecause q( these principles '.
The findings arc summarized in Table 3 . 
Discussion
In relation to the strength of the legal system, we expected that the Indian corporate governance system would more closely resemble the due to the presence of extensive regulations. However, data reveals hybridization. White there is an extensive body of regulations, they arc weakly enforced, What accounts for the hybridization? Typically, the Ang!o-Saxon system treats the legal rules and ethical customs of the society as external constraints to shareholder value maximisation, while the continental system includes legal rules and ethical customs in the stakeholder loss minimisation objective (Alpaslan, 2009 But, the presence ofcolTuption in the society and hlCk of enforcement of the rules stemming from unethical behavior also exists simultaneously as pointed out by CMD. The World Bank's CO ROSC for India (2004) identified regulatory arbitrage as the main reason for this weakness of the governance system. It stated that the 'Department of Company Affairs (DCA), SEBI and the stock exchanges share jurisdiction over listed companies. This creates a potential for regulatory arbitrage and weakens enioreement' (I'. 15). Fremond and Capaul in (2002: 2) in their survey of 15 countries observed that poor enforcement was a result of under-financed courts who arc ulllllotivated and unci car as to how the law appl ies, un fami liar with economic issues, or even corrupt; and, securi ties regulators who ha ve little direct power to enforce penalties.
In examining the importance of the stock market we expected that India with its tradition of rules would accord a high importance to the stock market. However the data points to hybridization yet (lgain with the importance of the Indian stock market placed betwcen the Amcricas and the Spanish exchanges.
In eva luating the presence of a sigll ificant shareholder, the tradition of family-bHscd finns in India would impl y the presence of a si nglc, large shareholder or promoter having H high degree of influence thus adhering more closely to the Continental system. The data supports this. The sharcholding data from the Annual Reports rcvcal~ that all five finns had a strong concentration of equ ity held by promoters, rang in g fi·oJl1 80% in Aluminiul11co, to 23% in Textilcmachineryco. The data further reveals that the founders had a high degree of influence on their organization's corpora I.e governance practices.
As (0 the shareholding pattern, India's pro!lloterbased holding patterns would mean a low free float factor as typicaJly found in Continental systems. The datll confi rm s that the free float factor is very 10'\' 1"01' all five firms. thereby revea ling sim ilHrities to the Contin cnta l governance system.
In comparing systems we have also (Irgucd that the Anglo-Saxon system exhibit's (I low level of control by banks on the Boards of finns. Indi an businesses with their low bank debt implying low control by banks provide similaritics to the Anglo-Saxon system. Data confirms the resemblance of the Indian governance system to the Anglo-Saxon system. as only one finn had approximately 20% ownership by banks, while the remaining fOllr firms had 0% to 2% ownership.
finally, the assumption of extensive regulations implies a single-tier board with a high proportion of independent directors, typical of an Anglo-Saxon system. Data points to hybridization as the smnplc firms exhibit both single-ticred boa rds, as wel1 as twotiered boards. The number of board members also exhibi ts the presence of a mixed systclll. Those finns using a single-ticr structure, however, d isph-lycd greater director independence.
TIle Indian bybrid corporate governance model is portrayed in Figure 2 . It demonstrates thnt the hybridization has evolved not only through a combina tion of characteristics from both the Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems, but also due to the cOLintry-specific culture, values, ideologies and religioLis faith. , . 
Concluding remarks
A cycle has been in moti on since the collapse of Enron where corporate governan ce failures ha ve led to increased regulation; a new loophole in the regu lation is exploited leading to addit ional governan ce lapses, wh ich in turn prompts furth er regu lation. However, what we have failed to notice is th e poss ibilit y of th e ex isten ce of a virtuous cycle in reverse: exemplary corpora te governance practices being mandated as law and the birth of best practices cont inuing to become a regulation. This is evident from thi s study, albei t a very small sam ple. This aspect requires further research using larger samples.
Exit is costly Limited free float Banks represented on Board
What does India's future corporate governan ce system look like? The study hi ghli ghts that corporate governance system s evolve and change as firm s engage in proacti ve or reactive practices. For the large Indi an business groups, PSUs and other private firms which had been following best practice prin cipl ebased governance practi ces, it seems to be merely a matter of reporting and disclos ing what th ey had been doing all along. The public became aware of th ese firm s' exemplary practices. Thus, the regulati ons and disclosure policies benefited th em. However, the interview data hints that smaller private [inns may have a ditTerent governance system. Th e comment links profits to cheating. The scope of this study was limited to large listed compani es and busin ess groups. A wider sample that includes sma ll er private firms and unaffiliated firms will provide data that can be general ized.
As Thyi l and Young (2009) observed, ''1ft er India's independence in i 947, cOl porate governance praclices in india were modelled on the values and philosophy q/ India 's political leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who instilled in the public mind the concepts 0/ "trusteeship" and social jllslice'. All five fi rms reported th at CSR acti vities were a part of th eir good governance agenda. This approach slemmed from the principl e of 'giving back to the society'. The data high lights that the firms have traditiona ll y encompassed several stakeholders, included CSR as part of good governance, and voluntarily embraced a principle-cenh'ed approach. C lear ly, this wide stakeho lder embrace has benefi tted the firms by providing th em with the stability and security needed for sustainable busin ess, and exhibited beneficial flow-on effects to the general public in th e vicinity of the firm, and th e loca l govcrnment, forgi ng a bond between the finn and its surround ings. It could be regarded that these finns' exemplary practices include proactive di sc losures, commu nity re lations and green management th at are yet to be mandated by laws, a continuous improvement in transparency of their processes and enhanced equity and justice. Thus, as poi nted out by severa l researchers (see West, 2009) , it is also necessary to un derstand the fundamental sets of val ues, attitud es, and beliefs that underpin Ind ia 's lega l and economic structures so as to identify the ' appropriate' governance structures fo r India and gauge th e effectiveness of the hybrid system.
There does not appear to be one-best-way with the inh erent flexibi lity in the approach provided by the principles-based approach. As Nestor and Thompson (200 I: 37) observed, although convergence is occurring in corporate governance due to the g loba lization of financial and product markets, one should not expect uniform corporate governance in stitutions and alTan gements throughout the wor ld, because ownership and control structures emanate from the particular society's core characteristics, and, hence, will remain idiosyn cratic to a considerable degree. Also, as observed by Yoshikawa and Ra sheed (2009), a comparati ve study of hybrid practices in different countries is also needed to provide in sight into whether convergence is in evitable or not. This paper has revea led Ind ia's home-grown corporate governance system and the extent and nature of hybridization withi n th e system. The interview data in particular has explored statements around va lues and estab lished practi ces, thereby hi ghli ghtin g the explicit culture and norms of Indian (irms. As West (2009) argued, 'corporate governan ce models worl dwide shou ld be mapped according to culture, rather than the lega l system, for a more accurat e and useful pict ure' as th e evolution of country-specifi c govern an ce is ' path dependent '. This paper in exploring a set of large establi shed firms highlights the interdependencics of the lega l systems , va lues, culture and norms in governance leading to a particular set of govern ance practices, own ership structures and organisational purpose.
